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Abstract: The present author first considers the risk of contractor's capability to fulfill contract as well as the risk of 
the state policy and market change during the turnover process of the rural land use right. It is found that the basic 
remising price of rural land use right is determined by the NPV method, and that the final transferring price is 
determined by the game analytical method. The price is set by the theory of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium after 
comprehensively considering the interest of supervisor, transferor, and transferee. 
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1. Introduction 
Rural land circulation refers to the land turnover between farmers, which can be realized by subcontracting, 
transferring, leasing, exchanging, pooling, etc. Subcontracting is the main way of spontaneous land circulation 
between farmers, who live on agricultural production [1]. The present paper measures transferring price of rural land 
use right set in the form of spontaneous circulation between farmers. Up to date, the transferring price of rural land 
use right has not come to an agreement in theory, and cannot refer to any measurement mode in practice[2]
The second is from changes in government policy and market. As there are many possibilities in the future 
development, too long contract term of land circulation may lead to the interest loss of the farmer contractor or 
social contradictions. For example, the government has new policies that the farmer will not pay any tax, and will 
enjoy some subsidies for growing grains and financial subsidies. In this case, the former farmer believes that the 
.
Therefore, a study in transferring right of rural household contract land use right, which can be theoretical basis and 
effective in implementation, is significant for promoting rural land circulation and reducing disputes.
2. Estimate for land use right transfer income
2.1 Major risks in land circulation
Qing Haiqiong, et al (2009) believe that land circulation risks are mainly divided into risks in and after land 
circulation. The former includes enclosure movement risk, supervision and administration risk, economic dispute 
risk and risk of farmer getting small profit, and the latter includes risk of farmer losing land, social stability risk, 
food security risk, city pressure risk and agricultural risk[3].
If land circulation is considered as market behaviour, the client will encounter the following two risks.
The first is from the contractor's capacity to fulfill contract. The land circulation contract usually has a long 
fulfilling term. In the fulfilling process, if the contractor cannot well manage, it is difficult for the client to pay his 
contracting fees according to the agreement. 
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subsidies belong to be him, while the contractor believes that the subsidies belong to be him, so that disputes will 
emerge.
2.2 Estimate for transfer income based on NPV
At present, there are methods to value farm land price, such as soil potential valuation, income capitalization 
approach, market analytical approach, mathematical mode approach, cost approach, standard field approach, etc. 
However, the target of these researches is land property right, which is distinctly different from land use right[2].
The price of farmer circulation land use right should be made in an easy way other than in a difficult way. And 
the general method is to subtract production cost from land income. As it is very hard to predict the sale income of 
agricultural products and product cost, it is not suitable for farmers to adopt. The present author predicts the net 
income of next term by trend extrapolation, and then fixes the present value of land earning in the contract term by 
NPV. Let S1, S2, S3, S4, S5 be the net income of recent 5 years (maybe 3 or 4 years, etc). Farmers have a good 
knowledge of the information, and give a weight to each year (the nearer to the predicted term, the greater the 
weight is). R1 is the first year of the predicted term, and the rest can be done in the same manner. Due to the long 
contract term, there will be a discount for future income, ¦
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 . Since the transferor will not farm the land and transfers the use 
right, his income will a percentage of W, and W/ is the negotiation base price.
3. Transferring price game
3.1 Basic assumptions
(1) Although various factors are considered when W is determined, the two parties have asymmetric information. 
For example, the contractor only knows that the predicted income of the transferor is distributed among the interval 
[0, 1].
(2) It is supposed that the transferor and the contractor will bargain twice at most (It is certain that they can 
bargain for many times, but the more times they bargain, the higher the negotiation fee is. Reasonably determining 
W is one cause of reducing negotiation time). For the convenience of analysis, it is supposed that the transferor first 
offers the transaction price in the negotiation, and the contractor chooses whether to accept or not. The bid interval 
is ),( YX WW , ),( YX WWW  .
(3) If the contractor reaches an agreement with the transferor in the first round of negotiation, the game ends 
ahead of time, otherwise the second round begins. If the agreement is reached in the second round, both parties will 
lose some profits. G is the conversion coefficient of the earning when both sides come to an agreement in the first 
round. It means that both sides will pay more for extra rounds, such as time value and actual expenditure, otherwise 
both sides will welcome more rounds (Especially in the negotiation of many rounds, the agreement will not be 
reached if there is no such discount.). If 1W is the price proposed by the transferor in the first round, 2W is the price 
in the second round, and both parties come to an agreement in the first round, the income of the transferor is 2W
and that of the contractor is )( 2WSG . If they cannot work out the agreement in the second round, their income 
will both be 0.
3.2 Equilibrium price determination
According to the hypotheses above, an analysis can be made based on the negotiation model between trade union 
and manufacturer with incomplete information[4].
In the first round, the transferor proposes that the price should be 1W . IfS , the income of the contractor, is more 
than 1S , the contractor will accept 1W , otherwise he will refuse to accept 1W .
If the price is refused in the first round, the judgment of the transferor on the income of the contractor will be 
revised and it will be uniformly distributed in the interval [0, *1S ]. In the second round, the price is 2W )( 12 WW  .
If the income of the contractor S is more than 2W , the price will be accepted, otherwise it will be refused again.
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We will begin to discuss sequentially rational strategy of both parties from the second round with the train of 
thought that is similar to backward induction, and then deduce its solution to Nash equilibrium.
We will first examine the contractor's choice in the second round (it is supposed that the he refuses in the first 
round). For the contractor, it is the last chance. If he refuses again, it means that both of their income is zero. 
Therefore, if 2WtS , he will choose to accept and will not care how much 1W is in the next round. The income of 
the contractor is )( 2WSG at this moment.
Then we will look at the transferor's choice in the second round. At first, the transferor knows the choice way of 
the contractor at this stage. That is, the contractor considers 2WtS as the evaluation standard. Secondly, the 
transferor believes that the income of the contractor is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1S ] at this moment 
(Notice: 1S is arbitrarily assumed and its constant value is discussed in the first round.). Therefore, the transferor 
chooses 2W to maximize his income, namely, 
max
2w
( ra ppW 222 0 )
ap2 and rp2 respectively represent the probabilities that the contractor accepts and refuses 2W .
ap2 = > @2WP tS and rp2 = > @2WP S . According to the judgment of the transferor on the contractor, 
ap2 = > @2WP tS = 121 )( SS W , but rp2 = > @2WP S = 12 SW . As a result, the above maximum problem 
turns out to bemax
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Therefore, the optimal choice of the transferor is 2W = 21S . And if the contractor accepts the requirement in 
the second round, the income of the transferor is 21GS and that of the contractor is 2)( 1SSG  .
Now we come back to the first round. The contractor has known that his maximum income 2)( 1SSG  is in 
the second round. Consequently, the condition that he accepts 1W in this round is his 
income )2( 11 SSGS tW . By operation, we get 
G
GSS 
t
1
211W That is to say, when the contractor's income S meets the need of the inequality above, he 
will choose to accept. So the right of the inequality is 1S . Given  
G
GSS 
 
1
211
1
W
, and the solution is GS  2
2 1
1
W
.
The transferor knows the above decisions of the contractor in the first round and the result of the second round. 
Therefore, the price 1W , chosen by the transferor will make his expected profit maximum. That is, it will meet the 
requirements of 
max
1w
> @raa pWWWp )( 121 G            
ap1 is the probability that the contractor accepts 1W in the first round. 
)2/()22()2/(211 1111 GGGS    WWp a , rap is the probability that he refuses it in 
the first round but accepts it in the second round. > @> @ > @> @ )2/(/)2/(.)2/(2/)(.)2/(2. 11111121121 GSSSGSSG     WWWWppp arra And 
after substitution, we get
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The above strategy profile and judgement is perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In the equilibrium, the contractor 
with higher profit would choose to accept the price of the transferor, and contractor with lower profit will refuse it in 
every round. The judgement of the transferor in the second round indicates that the contractor will accept the price 
in the first round if he gains high profits.
4. Conclusion
(1) The farmers make basic judgement of the future of their fields and the judgement includes some risks. Based 
on forecasting the future net return, the discounting is made by considering the time value of money and the 
inflation factor. The determined total profits will be the base price of the negotiation between two parties. As the 
operating is not a complex mathematical model, it tallies with the negotiation between farmers, and it is easy to 
operate for the intermediary organizations of rural land use right transaction.
(2) The transferring price, finally determined by trade union with incomplete information and negotiation model 
of the companies, is an equilibrium price, which is accepted by both sides. And the price depends on the conversion 
factor of the profits.
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